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The social media paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression
and the criminal law
Peter Coea,b*
aAston University, Aston Law, Birmingham, UK; bEast Anglian Chambers, Norwich, UK
This article begins by setting out the human rights provisions that apply to social media
expression. It then provides insight into the part social media plays within our society by
analysing the social media landscape and how it facilitates a ‘purer’ form of expression.
The social media paradox is explored through the lens of current societal issues and
concerns regarding the use of social media and how these have manifested into
litigation. It concludes by analysing the tension that the application of an array of
criminal legislation and jurisprudence has created with freedom of expression, and
whether this can successfully mitigated by the Director of Public Prosecution’s
Interim Guidelines.
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1. Introduction
The media landscape is undergoing profound change, on an unprecedented scale and at an
exponential pace, at the forefront of which is social media. This communication revolution
has been recognised within a variety of international arenas. For instance, in 2011, the
United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee (HRC) stated:
[I]nternet and mobile based electronic information dissemination systems, have substantially
changed communication practices around the world. There is now a global network for exchan-
ging ideas and opinions that does not necessarily rely on the traditional mass media
intermediaries.1
On UN World Press Day in 2012, Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, the then President of the UN
General Assembly, said: ‘Governments that try to suppress or shut-down new media plat-
forms should rather embrace new media for the beneﬁcial transformation of their
societies.’2 Further, in early 2014, the House of Lords Select Committee on Communi-
cations Report on Media Plurality recognised the increasingly important role that new
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
*Email: p.coe@aston.ac.uk
1Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of opinion and expression, CCPR/C/
GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [15]; see also, O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article
19 of the ICCPR and Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34, (2012) 12 Human
Rights Law Review 627.
2UN Highlights Role of Press Freedom as Catalyst for Social and Political Change, UN News Centre
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41911&Cr=journalist&Cr1> accessed 28 April
2014.
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media is playing within society.3 These views have been mirrored in the USA, where the
inﬂuence of social media was summed up by the Criminal Court of the City of
New York in New York v Harris: ‘The reality of today’s world is that social media,
whether it be Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, Google+ or any other site, is the way people
communicate’.4
Social media is both dynamic and organic. Platforms that have come to be synonymous
with the terms ‘social media’ and ‘social networking’, such as Facebook and Twitter, are
constantly evolving to meet, not only the needs and wants of their users, and the objectives
of their owners, but also to compete against other, emerging platforms, and to continue to
develop within the technological and economical infrastructures they inhabit.5
Due to its structural ﬂuidity, social media has been deﬁned in a number of ways. For
instance, it has been said that it is ‘a group of Internet-based applications that build on
the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation
and exchange of User Generated Content’.6 It has also been described as
web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public proﬁle within
a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3)
view and transverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.7
These deﬁnitions recognise social media as a tool that has changed the way in which we
communicate, giving rise to a culture of sharing and voluntariness.8 According to Professor
Van Dijck, social media has created a new: ‘online layer through which people organise
their lives… this layer of platforms inﬂuences human interaction on an individual and com-
munity level, as well as on a larger societal level, while the worlds of online and ofﬂine are
increasingly interpenetrating’.9
This article will begin by setting out the human rights provisions that apply to social
media expression. It will then consider the social media landscape and how it facilitates
a ‘purer’ form of expression. Current issues and concerns regarding the use of social
media are explored to set the scene and provide context for the ﬁnal section, which
looks at how some of these issues have translated into criminal litigation and how the
law has coped with social media expression to date.
2. Human rights: the legal landscape
The principles and accepted norms relating to the operation of social media expression, pur-
suant to human rights treaties and jurisprudence, predominantly emanate from an era that
3House of Lords Select Committee on Communications 1st Report of Session 2013–14, Media Plur-
ality, 4th February 2014, [46]–[52].
4New York v Harris, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1871 *3, note 3 (Crim. Ct. City of N.Y., N.Y. County,
2012).
5J. Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford University
Press, 2013), 7.
6AM. Kaplan and M Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social
Media, Business Horizons (2010) 53, 59–68, 61.
7DM. Boyd and NB. Ellison (2007), Social Network Sites: Deﬁnition, History and Scholarship,
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13: 210–30, 211.
8DR. Stewart (ed), Social Media and the Law (Routledge, 2013), viii; see also, C. Shirky,Here Comes
Everybody (Allen Lane, 2008), 17.
9Van Dijck (n 5), 4.
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could not have envisaged the social media revolution. Despite this, expression, via social
media platforms, is subject to these various provisions. This section sets out the relevant
framework under both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
2.1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, to which the UK is a signatory, states:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
According to the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur’s Report on the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this provision applies to
the internet,10 as it has become a means by which individuals can facilitate their right to
freedom of opinion and expression. It provides access to information that was previously
unobtainable, and therefore contributes to the discovery of truth and the progress of
society.11 In addition to the internet generally, the report states that Article 19(2) was
drafted with foresight to cover advances in technology through which expression can be
made.12 The HRC has suggested that methods of expression include: ‘all forms of elec-
tronic and internet-based modes of expression’.13 Thus, clearly, in the eyes of the HRC,
this renders the provision relevant and applicable to new and emerging communication
technology, such as social media platforms.
The HRC has also recognised that certain forms of expression can be subject to restric-
tion.14 To ensure the legitimacy of any such restriction on freedom of expression, the regu-
latory/legislative framework and/or jurisprudential reasoning in question must fall within
the parameters of Article 19(3).15 These frameworks must provide for the differences
between the print, broadcast and internet media sectors, while also taking into account
their convergence.16 Any restrictions that are imposed on the operation of internet-based
search providers or communication platforms, including social media, must fall within
the parameters of Article 19(3), which provides:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of
10F. La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protec-
tion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/17/27, 16th May 2011, [21]; see also,
UN General Assembly Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human
rights on the Internet, Resolution 20/8, A/HRC/RES/20/8, 29th June 2012, [1].
11Ibid. [19].
12La Rue (n 10), [21].
13UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/
C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12 September 2011, [12].
14Ibid, [11]; see also, F. La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur (n 10),
[25].
15La Rue (n 10), [23]–[24]; see also, UN Human Rights Council, Promotion and protection of all
human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development,
Fourteenth Session, A/HRC/14/23, 20th April 2010, [72]–[87].
16UN Human Rights Committee (n 13), [34].
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others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
Although, in Ross v Canada,17 Article 19(2) was held to encapsulate expression that
may be deemed deeply offensive,18 the HRC has stated that such expression, in different
circumstances, could give rise to legitimate restriction pursuant to 19(3).19 Other forms
of expression that can be subject to permissible restriction under the provision include,
inter alia: hate speech;20 defamation; advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.21
2.2. ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights
Article 10(1) ECHR provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public auth-
ority and regardless of frontiers.
Article 10(1) is qualiﬁed by Article 10(2), which states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in conﬁdence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as stated inHandyside
v United Kingdom,22 is very similar to that of the HRC,23 as it determines that freedom of
expression includes the right to say things or express opinions ‘that offend, shock or disturb
the state or any sector of the population’.24
In order to determine whether particular expression has been subject to legitimate
restriction within the conﬁnes of 10(2), the ECtHR, and domestic courts, have attributed
a hierarchical value25 to different types of expression.
1718 October 2000, Communication No. 736/1997.
18See also UN Human Rights Committee (n 13), [34].
19Ibid. However, these ‘different circumstances’ have not been speciﬁed.
20See Faurisson v France, UN Human Rights Committee, communication 550/1993, views of 8th
November 1996.
21La Rue (n 10), [25].
22A 24 (1976); 1 EHRR 737.
2318 October 2000, Communication No. 736/1997; UN Human Rights Committee (n 13), [34].
24Handyside (n 22), [49]; see also, Éditions Plon v France App. No 58184/00 ECHR 2004-IV, [42]–
[43].
25The high/low level speech terminology was developed in the USA through scholarship on the First
Amendment. See J. Rowbottom, To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech, C.L.
J. 2012, 71(2), 355–83, 368 citing C. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech
(New York: 1993), 122–23. See generally: L. Scaife, The DPP and social media: a new approach
coming out of the Woods? Comms. L. (2013), 18(1), 5–10, 8.
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According to ECtHR jurisprudence, political expression affords the strongest protec-
tion.26 This view has been mirrored by the House of Lords.27 For instance, in Campbell
v MGN,28 Baroness Hale stated:
The free exchange of information and ideas on matters relevant to the organisation of the econ-
omic, social and political life of the country is crucial to any democracy. Without this it can
scarcely be called a democracy at all.29
Within the value hierarchy political expression is followed, ﬁrst, by artistic expression,30
and then by commercial expression,31 both of which attract intermediate protection.32
Under this comes celebrity gossip,33 and then pornography.34 Finally, at the very bottom
of the hierarchy, and attracting little, if any protection, are gratuitous personal attacks35
and hate speech.36
In Fuentes Bobo v Spain,37 the ECtHR determined that, in deciding whether par-
ticular expression is of high or low value, it would have regard to whether the
author had the opportunity to prepare what was expressed and whether there has
been a ‘possibility of reformulating, perfecting or retracting’38 the content of the
expression before it is made available to the public.39 This is particularly relevant in
the context of social media as platforms for user speech, as discussed in the following
section.
Pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), it is unlawful for prosecu-
tors and judges to act incompatibly with ECHR rights. Further, section 3 of the HRA
requires judges to interpret legislation compatibly with ECHR rights, if it is possible to
do so. In addition, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the HRC is clear: there is a right
to expression that is offensive, shocking or disturbing.40 Thus, as dealt with in section 5,
26TV Vest As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway [2008] ECHR 21132/05, [59]; Lingens v Austria
(1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, [42]; Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 1, [58]; United Com-
munist Party of Turkey v Turkey (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 121, [45]; Nilsen v Norway (2000) 30 E.H.R.R.
878, [46]; Vgt Verein gegen Tierfabriken (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 4, [66];Murphy v Ireland (2004) 38 E.H.
R.R. 13, [67].
27See R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23, [6] per Lord Nicholls; R v Shayler [2002] UKHL
11, [21] per Lord Bingham.
28[2004] UKHL 22.
29Ibid. [148].
30Muller v Switzerland (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 212; Otto Preminger v Austria (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 34;
IA v Turkey (2007) E.H.R.R. 30.
31Markt Intern v Germany (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 161, [33].
32Rowbottom (n 25), 368.
33Campbell (n 28), [149].
34Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19, [38].
35Gorelishvili v Georgia (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 36, [40].
36Lehideux and Isornia v France (1998) 5 B.H.R.C. 540, [53]; Norwood v United Kingdom (2004) 40
E.H.R.R. SE 111.
37(2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 50.
38Ibid. [46].
39See generally: L. Scaife, The DPP and social media: a new approach coming out of the Woods?
Comms. L. (2013), 18(1), 5–10.
40Handyside (n 22); EHRR 737 [49]; Ross v Canada 18 October 2000, Communication No. 736/
1997; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression,
CCPR/C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [11].
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the potential for social media activity to conﬂict with freedom of expression is most obvious
when expression is criminalised.41
3. The (social) media landscape: platforms for a ‘purer’ form of expression?
The origins of the traditional media, and in particular the press industry, may well be
founded on freedom of expression philosophy,42 and the notion that, as ‘the fourth
estate’, its primary function is to act as a ‘public watchdog’,43 in that it operates as the
general public’s ‘eyes and ears’ by investigating and reporting abuses of power.44
However, it is submitted that media ownership, and the power derived from it, means
that there is a constant conﬂict between these underpinnings and commercial reality. Con-
sequently, until relatively recently, the public were, to a greater extent, limited as to what
they were exposed to reading or seeing, by what large proportions of the traditional
media chose to publish or broadcast. Such decisions may have come down to editorial
control, based on, for instance, owner or political bias, commercial revenue or both.
Social media platforms have changed this media landscape forever, as they have altered
our perceptions of the limits of communication and reception of information. It is no longer
the case that communication is constrained by boundaries, such as location, time, space or
culture.45 The gradual erosion of these boundaries is borne out by recent Ofﬁce for National
Statistics data, which states that, in 2013, 83% of Great British households had internet
access. Thirty-six million (73%) adults in Great Britain used the internet every day, equat-
ing to 20 million more than that in 2006; with 53% using a mobile phone to access it remo-
tely, more than double the 2010 ﬁgure of 24%.46 These ﬁgures are reﬂected by recent
statistics from the USA and the EU. As of May 2013, 80% of American adults had
either a broadband connection at home, or a smartphone or both.47 In 2012, the percentage
41D. McGoldrick, The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social Networking Sites: A
UK Perspective, HRLR 13 (2013), 125–51, 131 citing A. Bailin, Criminalising Free Speech? (2011)
Criminal Law Review, 9, 705–11.
42For detailed discussion on freedom of expression philosophy see, for instance: E. Barendt, Freedom
of Speech (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005); F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry
(Cambridge University Press, 1982); L. Alexander, Is there a Right to Freedom of Expression (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005); T. Campbell and W. Sadurski, Freedom of Communication (Dart-
mouth, 1994); JM. Bakin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society (2004) 79 New York U LR 1.
43Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, [59].
44A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 183 per Sir John Donaldson MR; see
also Barendt (n 42), 418.
45See generally: F. Webster, Theories of the Information Society (4th edn, Routledge, 2014), 20;
I. Barron and R. Curnow, The Future with Microelectronics: Forecasting the Effects of Information
Technology (Pinter, 1979); G. Mulgan, Communication and Control: Networks and the New Econom-
ies of Communication (Polity, 1991).
46Indeed, if you add ‘portable computers’ to this, the percentage of people accessing the internet ‘on
the go’ in 2013 rises to 61%: Ofﬁce for National Statistics, Internet Access – Households and Indi-
viduals, 2013, 8 August 2013 <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_322713.pdf> accessed 27
March 2014.
47The 80% breaks down as follows: 46% have both home broadband connection and a smartphone;
24% have home broadband connection but no smartphone; 10% have a smartphone, but not home
broadband connection: K. Zickurh and A. Smith, Home Broadband 2013, PewResearch Internet
Project, 26 August 2013 <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home-broadband-2013/>;
A. Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PewResearch Internet Project, 5 June 2013 <http://www.
pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013/> both accessed 27 March 2014.
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of individuals in the EU who used the internet was 73%, 30% of which gained access via
mobile devices away from home or work.48 Worldwide, the estimated number of internet
users exceeds two billion.49
Our access to multiple social media outlets and platforms 24 hours a day that, due to
mobile phones, tablets and laptops, can be accessed instantaneously, regardless of location
or time, is symptomatic of how new media has evolved to take full advantage of this trans-
cendence of traditional boundaries. Thus, users, forming what Benkler refers to as the ‘net-
worked public sphere’,50 can transmit and receive information to one and other, via
platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Snapchat, without the
need to consider, what have become, the arbitrary boundaries mentioned above. When in
place, these boundaries acted as a natural ﬁltration system for news and information.
Their dilution has enabled real-time relationships to exist without any physical inter-
action.51 Consequently, Professor McLuhan’s proclamation, that the ‘medium is the
message’,52 seems both prophetic and entirely apt for the social media era as, according
to McLuhan, the media is an extension of ourselves, and new mediums introduced into
our lives give rise to personal and social consequences, as a result of that new ‘extension’.53
Accordingly: ‘the message of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or
pattern that it introduces into human affairs’.54
The way in which the media envelopes our existence is ampliﬁed by social media. Plat-
forms such as Facebook and Twitter have become an embodiment of McLuhan’s ‘extension
of man’, and a facilitator of unﬁltered expression, by being platforms for user speech, as
opposed to that of a media organisation’s ownership, employees or political stance. Tra-
ditional media organisations simply no longer monopolise the methods we use to ﬁnd
and facilitate news-gathering, communication or reception, or indeed how we express
opinions and ideas. For instance, the death of Osama Bin Laden was leaked on Twitter,
before being published by any newspaper.55 Edward Snowden disclosed information
regarding American surveillance programmes to blogger Glenn Greenwald, as he did not
trust the New York Times to publish the material.56 Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad,
and his opposing rebels distribute competing propaganda via Instagram.57 Chelsea
Manning, the US soldier convicted in 2013 for, inter alia, offences pursuant to the
48H. Seybert, Internet use in households and by individuals in 2012, Eurostat, 2012 <http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-050/EN/KS-SF-12-050-EN.PDF> accessed
27 March 2014.
49La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur (n 10), [21]; see also, UN
General Assembly Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human
rights on the Internet, Resolution 20/8, A/HRC/RES/20/8, 29 June 2012, [2].
50Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (Yale University Press, 2006), 212.
51B. Wellman, Physical Space and Cyberspace: The Rise of Personalised Networking, International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2), 227–51.
52M. McLuhan, Understanding Media The Extensions of Man (MIT Press, 1964), 7.
53Ibid.
54McLuhan (n 52), 8.
55B. Shelter,How the Bin Laden Announcement LeakedOut, NewYork Times, 1May 2011 <http://med-
iadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/how-the-osama-announcement-leaked-out/?_php=true&_ty-
pe=blogs&_r=0> accessed 12 September 2014.
56M. Ammori, The “new” New York Times: Free speech lawyering in the age of Google and Twitter,
Harvard Law Review, 2014, vol. 127: 2259–95, 2265.
57N. Gaouette, Assad on Instagram Vies with Rebel Videos to Seek Support, Bloomberg, 19 September
2013 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-19/assad-on-instagram-vies-with-rebel-videos-to-
seek-support.html> accessed 12 September 2014.
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Espionage Act, leaked classiﬁed documents to WikiLeaks, as opposed to a ‘traditional’
media outlet.58
Thus, never before has a form of media changed the ‘scale, pace or pattern’ of human
affairs to such an extent, within such a short period of time.59 These platforms are used as
a way of, not only receiving news,60 but also of instantaneously, and often spontaneously,
without ﬁlter, expressing opinions and venting and sharing emotions, thoughts and feel-
ings,61 circumventing the mass media, and giving rise to a convergence of audience and pro-
ducer.62 This is illustrated by using statistics to compare the use of new, and in particular
social, media with traditional media. For example, the New York Times 2013 print and
digital circulation was approximately two million,63 enabling it to proclaim that it was the
‘#1 individual newspaper site’ on the internet, with nearly 31 million unique visitors per
month.64 In contrast, YouTube, which is owned by Google, has one billion unique visitors
per month65 which, according to Marvin Ammori, equates to: ‘thirty times more than the
New York Times, or as many unique visitors in a day as the [New York] Times has every
month’.66 Incidentally, Google’s search engine reached a billion monthly users in 2011.67
According to WordPress’ statistics, it hosts blogs written in over 120 languages, equating
to over 409 million users viewing more than 15.8 billion pages each month. Consequently,
users produce approximately 43.7 million new posts and 58.8 million new comments on a
monthly basis. These users can choose to create and maintain anonymous blogs. Moreover,
companies such asCNN,UPS andNBCSports use the facility tomanage their sites.68 Twitter
states that it normally ‘takes in’ approximately 500 million Tweets per day, equating to an
average of 5700 Tweets per second.69 It has more visitors per week than the New York
Times does in a month.70 Similarly, Tumblr hosts over 170 million microblogs71 and, with
300 million visits per month, enjoys 10 times more than the New York Times.72 According
58Benkler (n 50), 348.
59Consequently, Time magazine named ‘You’ the person of the year in 2006: ‘for seizing the reins of
the global media, for founding and framing the new digital democracy, for working for nothing and
beating the pros at their own game.’ See L. Grossman, You-Yes, You- Are TIME’S Person of the Year,
Time, 25 December 2006 <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html>
accessed 18 September 2014.
60According to Ofcom’s report, The Communications Market 2013 (at para. 1.9.7), 23% of people use
social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, for news: <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/UK_1.pdf> accessed 19 March 2014.
61Indeed, in April 2014 Facebook emailed its users to inform them that the messages function is
moving out of the Facebook application due to their Messenger application enabling users to reply
20% faster than using Facebook.
62See generally: Rowbottom (n 25), 365.
63C. Haughney, Newspapers Post Gains in Digital Circulation, New York Times, 30 April 2014
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/business/media/digital-subscribers-buoy-newspaper-
circulation.html> accessed 12 September 2014.
64New York Times Media Kit <http://perma.cc/B5KA-VMGC> accessed 12 September 2014.
65Statistics YouTube <http://perma.cc/S8W5-ZRM4> accessed 12 September 2014.
66Ammori (n 56), 2266.
67Ibid.
68<http://en.wordpress.com/stats/> accessed 22 September 2014.
69<https://blog.twitter.com/2013/new-tweets-per-second-record-and-how> accessed 14 March 2014.
70Ammori (n 56).
71Ibid. 2272.
72J. Yarow, The Truth About Tumblr: Its Numbers Are Signiﬁcantly Worse than You Think, Business
Insider, 21 May 2013 <http://www.businessinsider.com/tumblrs-active-users-lighter-than-expected-
2013-5> accessed 12 September 2014.
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to Facebook, as of 31December 2013, it had 1.23 billionmonthly active users, 945million of
which use their mobile applications.73 Late 2013 saw Instagram’s global usage expand by
15%, in just two months, to 150 million people.74 LinkedIn’s current membership is 277
million.75 These established platforms are only the ‘tip of the new media iceberg’. Pinterest
continues to grow rapidly,76 as do emerging platforms, such as Snapchat and WhatsApp.77
Consequently, for many people, social media platforms have not just replaced the written
word; but they also have become a substitute for the spoken word.
4. Issues and concerns regarding the use of social media: setting the ‘social media
paradox’ scene
It is clear that social media, as an extension of man, can liberate and empower individuals,
regardless of social status.78 It has borne millions of ‘publishers’who are able to circumvent
the traditional mass media. On the one hand, it is arguable that this can only be good for
freedom of expression and, incidentally, freedom of thought. These ‘publishers’ are not
subject to the ﬁlter system discussed above and, for instance, political bias, censorship,
the inﬂuence of media ownership or editorial control. In many ways, social media facilitates
freedom of expression in its purest form.
On the other hand, however, this power can intoxicate individuals, who are
perhaps not prepared for the responsibility that comes with its use, and leads them to
communicate as though they operate within a ‘“Wild West”, law free zone in
Cyberspace’.79 According to McGoldrick, this has led to ‘catastrophic consequences’.80
For example, individuals in the UK, and elsewhere, have been convicted of
criminal offences,81 investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,82 sued for
73<https://newsroom.fb.com/key-Facts> accessed 14 March 2014.
74<http://instagram.com/press/#>; UK Social Media Statistics for 2014 <http://socialmediatoday.com/
kate-rose-mcgrory/2040906/uk-social-media-statistics-2014> accessed 12 March 2014.
75<http://press.linkedin.com/about> accessed 14 March 2014.
76In 2011/2012 Pinterest had approximately 200,000 users in the UK. In the summer of 2013 this had
grown to over 2 million: <http://socialmediatoday.com/kate-rose-mcgrory/2040906/uk-social-media-
statistics-2014> accessed 12 March 2014.
77Ibid.
78McGoldrick (n 41), 130; see also Twitter’s ﬁghtback against depression, GQ Magazine, May 2014,
226. This article considers how the former professional footballer, Stan Collymore, used Twitter to
document his depression to raise awareness of mental illness to help other sufferers; P. Bernal, A
defence of responsible tweeting, Comms. L. (2014), 19(1), 12–19, 14–15.
79A. Yen,Western Frontieror Feudal Society?Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, (2002) 17 Ber-
keleyTechnologyLaw Journal 1207; see alsoG.Benaim,A futurewith socialmedia:WildWest orUtopia?
You have a stake in the outcome <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/a-future-with-social-media-
wild-west-or-utopia-you-have-a-stake-in-the-outcome-gideon-benaim/> accessed 16 May 2014.
80McGoldrick (n 41), 130–31.
81For example, see R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312.
82A 14-year-old Dutch girl was arrested by police in Rotterdam following a tweet made on 13 April
2014 to American Airlines, stating: ‘@AmericanAir hello my name’s Ibrahim and I’m from Afghani-
stan. I’m part of Al Qaida and on June 1st I’m gonna do something really big bye’. Following her
arrest American Airlines conﬁrmed that it would pass on the girl’s IP address to the FBI for investi-
gation: See, A. Withnall, Twitter’s American Airlines ‘terror threat’ 14-year-old girl arrested by
police in Rotterdam, The Independent, 14 April 2014 <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
gadgets-and-tech/twitters-american-airlines-terror-threat-14yearold-girl-arrested-by-police-in-rotterd
am-9259485.html>; J. McCully, Terror on Twitter <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/terror-
on-twitter-jonathan-mccully/#more-26428> both accessed 30 April 2014.
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defamation,83 and have been subject to disciplinary proceedings, and in some cases, dismis-
sal by their employer.84 Thus, a consequence of the ubiquity and diversity of these plat-
forms, and the way in which they have ingrained themselves within our social cultural
fabric, is that habits, conventions and social norms, that were once informal and transitory
manifestations of social life, are now infused within social media platforms. What were
casual and ephemeral actions and/or acts of expression, such as conversing with friends
or colleagues or swapping/displaying pictures, or exchanging thoughts that were once
kept private or maybe shared with a select few, have now become formalised and perma-
nent.85 Social media’s embodiment of the extension of man theory, and its transcendence
of a physical ﬁltration system, has meant that these actions and expressions are, in the
click of mouse, or the ﬂick of a ﬁnger, publicised for the world to see. They enter the
‘public domain, with the potential for long-lasting and far reaching-consequences’.86
The remainder of this section will illustrate the social media ‘paradox’ by considering
some of the current issues regarding the use of social media and how these conﬂict with the
notion of a purer form of freedom of expression. These clearly give rise to concerns regard-
ing, for example, individuals’ rights to privacy and reputation and their protection from har-
assment, bullying and threatening or abusive behaviour. Consequently, they set the scene
for the ﬁnal section, which looks at how some of these issues, in the context of criminal
prosecutions, have been translated into litigation, and how the law, which was not
drafted and devised with social media in mind, is coping.
4.1. Speaker control: Snapchat and Twitter
A concern with social media that has gained signiﬁcant traction during 2013 and 2014 is the
notion of ‘speaker control’.
83For example, see Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781; [2008] Info TLR
318; Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB); [2012] EWCA Civ 1382; Tilbrook v Parr [2012] EHHC
1946 (QB). See also the recent Australian case of Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295 (Farley, a
student, was ordered to pay Mickle, his teacher, A$105,000 in damages for tweets sent to his fol-
lowers) judgment accessible via <http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/pjudg?jgmtid=169992>; In
the USA, a Nevada court recently ordered the founder of a ‘revenge porn’ site to pay US$250,000
in damages for defamatory tweets stating that plaintiff was a pedophile who possessed child porno-
graphy: D, Lee, ‘Revenge porn’site owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11 March 2013 <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21740386> accessed 30 April 2014.
84See generally, P. Landau, The antisocial network: why Facebook abuse is a matter for employers,
The Guardian, 1 May 2012 <http://www.theguardian.com/money/work-blog/2012/may/01/antisocial-
network-facebook-abuse-employers> accessed 30 April 2014; There have also been a number of
instances involving, in particular, professional football players, who have been subject to disciplinary
action by their club and the Football Association following the use of social media. For example, see
generally: T. Lowles, Professional Footballers and Twitter: A match made in (tabloid) heaven <http://
inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/16/professional-footballers-and-twitter-a-match-made-in-tabloid-
heaven-tim-lowles/#more-24668> accessed 30 April 2014; P. Coe, Social Media ‘faux pas’: there’s
only one ‘tweeting’ winner <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/11/06/social-media-faux-pas-
theres-only-one-tweeting-winner-peter-coe/#more-28332> accessed 1 December 2014.
85Van Dijck (n 5), 6–7.
86Ibid. See also Rowbottom (n 25), 366–77; The case of the then 17-year-old Paris Brown who stood
down as Youth Police and Crime Commissioner over tweets she made when she was 14–16 years-old
V. Dodd, Youth crime commissioner Paris Brown stands down over Twitter row, The Guardian, 9
April 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/09/paris-brown-stands-down-twitter>
accessed 1 May 2014.
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For instance, in May 2014 it was announced that Snapchat had settled with the US
Federal Trade Commission for misleading its users over data collection, and failing to
inform them that their photos could be saved, thus raising concerns over the permanency
of pictures taken using its mobile phone application. Snapchat markets its platform on
the basis that the pictures, and any associated line of text applied to the picture, that are
shared between users are transitory, as they ‘self-destruct’ after a predetermined (by the
sender) number of seconds.87 However, by taking a screenshot of the picture, recipients
are able to save the image and text permanently, with the potential to distribute it elsewhere
via other social media platforms. There are also third-party applications available, such as
Snapsaved, SnapHack and SnapBox, which enable the recipient to surreptitiously save
photos they have received via Snapchat.88 These issues materialised in October 2014,
when www.snapsaved.com, a third-party ‘add-on’ site used to ‘store’ Snapchat pictures,
was hacked. Consequently, pictures stored by the application were made available
online. As well as explicit pictures of celebrities, such as Matt Smith, Rihanna and Jennifer
Lawrence, children were also affected, raising concerns over the use of the pictures within
child pornography. This highlights the vulnerability of applications such as Snapchat that
can be inﬁltrated by other, prohibited, add-on applications, despite the company’s best
efforts to remove them from the internet. Thus, in this instance, although Snapchat’s
servers were not breached, snapsaved’s were.89 This follows 4.6 million Snapchat accounts
being hacked in January 2014. Usernames and phone numbers were downloaded and made
available online via a website called SnapchatDB.90
A key feature of Twitter is that user A can ‘re-tweet’ user B’s ‘tweet’ to user A’s ‘fol-
lowers’. By virtue of user A’s re-tweet, user B’s post will be seen by a far wider audience
than their group of followers. This process can continue to be extrapolated out. Conse-
quently, a tweet to a relatively small group of individuals could end up being seen by a
very large number of people. Incidentally, popular tweets and re-tweets can be categorised
by Twitter as ‘trending’, meaning that popular ‘discussions’ appear on a trending list for all
Twitter users to access.
Speaker control, in the context of Twitter and re-tweeting, or Snapchat and taking a
screenshot of pictures, illustrates the paradoxical nature of social media. The instantaneous
process of tweeting, or taking a picture and possibly adding a line of text, facilitates freedom
of expression in its purest form. It is often unﬁltered and, in the case of Twitter, by virtue of
re-tweeting and trending, enables individuals to express themselves to a very wide audi-
ence. To the contrary, the re-tweeted audience or the recipients, via another social media
87At the time of writing Yahoo purchased a rival ‘self-destructing’ mobile messaging application
called Blink, in order to acquire the application’s developers to compete with platforms such as Snap-
chat: Yahoo buys self-destructing mobile messaging app Blink <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
27403813> accessed 16 May 2014.
88See generally: Snapchat settles with US regulators for deceiving users <http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-27335255>; M. Himsworth, Snapchat Secrets: overshare and risks moving to
new levels <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/05/13/snapchat-secrets-overshare-and-risks-moving-
to-new-levels-matt-himsworth/> both accessed 13 May 2014.
89Snapchat Hackers Post Explicit Images Online, 11 October 2014 <http://news.sky.com/story/
1351147/snapchat-hackers-post-explicit-images-online>; C. Arthur, Third-party Snapchat Site
claims photos were hacked from server, The Guardian, 13 October 2014 <http://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/oct/13/third-party-snapchat-site-claims-says-pics-were-hacked-from-server>
both accessed 28 October 2014.
90Snapchat hack affects 4.6 million users, 2 January 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
25572661> accessed 28 October 2014.
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platform of a surreptitiously saved Snapchat, may not be selected by them. They have no
control over who sees their post or picture. Therefore, their freedom to express themselves
is compromised by a lack of choice over their audience.
4.2. Cyber-bullying (trolling) and ‘revenge porn’
In 2014, the National Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) published
a report on ‘The experiences of 11–16 year olds on social networking sites’.91 The research
found that 28% of children with a social media proﬁle experienced something that has upset
them in the last year.92 These experiences included, inter alia: cyber-stalking (12%); being
subjected to aggressive or offensive language (18%); receiving sexually explicit pictures
(12%); and being asked to provide personal or private information (8%).93 The greatest pro-
portion of the group (37%) had experienced ‘trolling’,94 deﬁned by the report’s authors as,
‘any unkind, sarcastic or negative comments or rumours circulated online’.95 These stat-
istics mirror Childline’s review of 2012/2013,96 which found that there had been an 87%
increase in young people contacting the charity for counselling about online bullying.
This equates to 4500 young people accessing advice and support about being bullied via
social media platforms, chat rooms, online gaming sites or via their mobile phones.97 A
further report by Sky News makes it clear that online abuse is increasing and that it is
not only suffered, but also perpetrated, by children. Over the last three years 1932 children
have been subject to investigation regarding allegations of online abuse, offensive messages
and online bullying. Of that number 1203 were, either, charged with a criminal offence,
ﬁned, cautioned or warned verbally.98
In March 2014, the House of Commons Culture Media and Sport Committee published
its report on online safety,99 drawing on evidence, based on the statistics above, from the
NSPCC, Childline and BeatBullying.org.100 The report makes reference to the range of
91C. Lilley, R. Ball, H. Vernon, The experiences of 11–16 year olds on social networking sites,
NSPCC, 2014 available via <http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/onlinesaf-
ety/11-16-social-networking-report_wdf101574.pdf>. This follows previous research by the
Society on younger children’s use of social media: C. Lilley and R. Ball, Younger children and
social networking sites: a blind spot, NSPCC, 2013 available via <http://www.nspcc.org.uk/
Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/onlinesafety/younger-children-report_wdf99929.pdf>.
92Ibid. 12.
93Lilley et al (n 91), 13.
94Ibid.
95Lilley et al (n 91).
96Childline,What’s Affecting Children in 2013: Can I tell you something?NSPCC, 2013 available via
<http://www.nspcc.org.uk/news-and-views/media-centre/press-releases/2014/childline-report/child-
line-report_can-i-tell-you-something_wdf100354.pdf>.
97Ibid. 40.
98Of the 19,279 adults investigated over that period, 11,292 were subject to some of form of criminal
action. According to responses from thirty-four of the UK’s ﬁfty-one police forces, 6,919 people were
investigated in 2011/12 under section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003, including 744 chil-
dren. In 2012/13, 6,974 cases were investigated, including 578 under-18s. After the ﬁrst nine months
of 2013/14, those ﬁgures were already at 7,318 and 610 respectively. See T. Cheshire, Online Abuse:
Police Deal With Thousands of Kids, Sky News, 29 May 2014 <http://news.sky.com/story/1271004/
online-abuse-police-deal-with-thousands-of-kids> accessed 29 May 2014.
99Culture, Media and Sport Committee – Sixth Report Online Safety, 13 March 2014 <http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmcumeds/729/72902.htm> accessed 20 May
2014.
100Ibid. [88]–[92].
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legislation that currently applies to communications sent via social media, pursuant to
which criminal offences can exist. These include: Protection from Harassment Act 1997;
Malicious Communications Act 1988; Communications Act 2003; Offences Against the
Person Act 1861; Computer Misuse Act 1990; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994 and Sexual Offences Act 2003.101 In addition, the Director of Public Prosecutions
(DPP) has published Interim Guidelines for prosecutors when considering cases involving
communications via social media.102 The most commonly engaged provision has been
section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003, which is dealt with in more detail in
Section 5 below.
Although the report makes a number of recommendations, perhaps the most pertinent is
the recognition that the raft of legislation that is currently being applied to deal with issues
such as trolling is simply not ﬁt for purpose, as they were not drafted for the social media
era. This is illustrated by there being no speciﬁc criminal offence in the UK for cyber-bul-
lying, despite the statistics cited above.103 In addition to the Committee’s recommendation
for new, consolidating legislation, it also asks for the status of both ofﬂine and online bully-
ing to be clariﬁed, along with guidance as to the interpretation of existing laws.104 This
seems to have been, at least partly, heard by the Government as, in October 2014, Chris
Grayling, the Justice Minister, announced that the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill105
would amend the offence of ‘sending a letter, electronic communication or article of any
description’ which conveys a threat or abuse, pursuant to section 1 of the Malicious Com-
munications Act,106 to a triable either way offence, with a maximum sentence of two years
imprisonment.107
‘Revenge porn’ has given rise to concerns, both in the UK108 and in the USA,109 over
social media’s impact on user’s rights to privacy and reputation, and their protection from
harassment and offences against the person. Essentially, it involves individuals uploading
sexually explicit content of their ex-partners without permission. This content is made
available via speciﬁc websites that link to the respective subjects’ social media networks,
enabling subjects’ ‘friends’ or ‘followers’ to view the pictures.
At the time of writing, proposed amendments to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
will make revenge porn a speciﬁc offence, carrying a maximum sentence of two years
imprisonment. The offence will cover the sharing of images, both online and ofﬂine.
This means that images posted to social networking sites, as well as those distributed by
101Culture, Media and Sport Committee – Sixth Report Online Safety (n 99), [93]–[94].
102CPS, Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media, 19 Decem-
ber 2012 available via <<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_
media/>.
103Lilley et al (n 91), [96]–[97].
104Ibid. [97]; Conclusions and Recommendations [24].
105At the time of writing the Bill is at the Report stage. It enters the third Reading on the 10th of
November 2014.
106Internet trolls to face 2 years in prison, 20 October 2014 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
internet-trolls-to-face-2-years-in-prison>; Internet trolls face up to two years in jail under new laws,
19 October 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29678989> both accessed 28 October 2014.
107Pursuant to s1(4) the current maximum custodial sentence is six months imprisonment.
108At the time of writing, 149 allegations of revenge porn have been made in the past two and a half
years: House of Lords agree to make revenge porn a criminal offence, 20 October 2014 <http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29697600> accessed 28 October 2014.
109G. Dawson, Revenge Porn is increasing in the UK, say charities <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/
26851276> accessed 13 May 2014; D. Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site owner Hunter Moore sued for defa-
mation, 11 March 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21740386> accessed 30 April 2014.
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text message, email or in hard copy will be captured. Photographs or ﬁlms showing people
engaged in sexual activity, or depicted in a sexual way, or with their genitals exposed, where
what is shown would not usually be seen in public, will fall within its ambit.110 The change
in the law follows campaigning by UK charities for legislation to be introduced that mirrors
the USA111 where, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, Bills crim-
inalising revenge porn have been introduced, or are pending, in 27 states, with legislation
already enacted in Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin.112
However, as the law currently stands revenge porn could, depending on the circum-
stances, potentially give rise to offences pursuant to, inter alia, the Protection from Harass-
ment Act 1997, the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Malicious Communications Act
1988 and the Communications Act 2003. Civil litigation could also ensue for defama-
tion,113 breach of copyright114 or misuse of private information claims.
4.3. The right to be forgotten
In Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario
Costeja González115 the Court of Justice of the European Union held that search engine
operators are responsible for the processing of personal data appearing on web pages pub-
lished by third parties. Consequently, individuals whose personal information appears pur-
suant to a search may request that search engines, such as Google or Yahoo, remove the
links to the information, even though the initial publication of the information may have
been lawful.116 If the information is ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant’, it
must be erased.117 The individual, subject to the data, is not required to demonstrate any
prejudice emanating from the available information.118 This newly recognised right to be
forgotten overrides the economic interests of search engines, and the general interest in
freedom of information119 unless it appears that, for particular reasons, such as the role
played by the individual subject to the data, in public life, that the interference with their
right to be forgotten is justiﬁed by the preponderant interest of the general public in
having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in
question.120
110New law to tackle revenge porn, 12 October 2014 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-
law-to-tackle-revenge-porn> accessed 28 October 2014.
111For an example from the USA see G. Dawson, Revenge Porn is increasing in the UK, say charities
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/26851276> accessed 13 May 2014; D. Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site
owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11 March 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-21740386> accessed 30 April 2014.
112<http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-revenge-
porn-legislation.aspx> accessed 21 May 2014.
113For an example from the USA see G. Dawson, Revenge Porn is increasing in the UK, say charities
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/26851276> accessed 13 May 2014; D. Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site
owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11 March 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-21740386> accessed 30 April 2014.
114If an intimate image has been taken as a ‘selﬁe’, the picture’s copyright belongs to the ‘taker’.
115[2014] EUECJ C-131/12.
116Ibid. [89].
117Google Spain SL (n 115), [94].
118Ibid. [96].
119Google Spain SL (n 115), [91], [99].
120Ibid. [99].
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The potential impact of this judgment, and the right to be forgotten, once again demon-
strates social media’s paradoxical nature vis-à-vis the ‘dangers’ of the permanency of what
is often instantaneous and unﬁltered expression made via social media. For example, recent
research carried out by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development found that
two out of ﬁve employers look at candidates’ online activity or social media proﬁles to
inform their recruitment decisions.121 Thus, it seems that employers frequently base their
decision on whether to interview or employ candidates on comments or pictures that
were potentially posted or uploaded within a different context or at a different point in
the candidate’s life. The case of Paris Brown is a particularly good illustration. Brown
was, for six days, the UK’s ﬁrst Youth Police and Crime Commissioner. However, the
then 17-year-old stood down over comments she had posted on Twitter when she was
aged 14–16, that could have been interpreted as being homophobic and racist. Brown
gave a statement at the time of her resignation, stating that she had ‘fallen into a trap of
behaving with bravado on social networking sites’, but she denied she held homophobic
and racist views. Despite Ann Barnes, Kent’s adult Police and Youth Crime Commissioner,
opining that ‘ …many people today would not have the jobs they are in if their thoughts in
their teenage years were scrutinised’122 a Google search for ‘Paris Brown’ still lists, within
the top ﬁve results, a Daily Mail article from April 2013 calling her ‘foul-mouthed’ and
‘offensive’.123
4.4. Public disorder
On a State level, commentators have suggested that social media can manifest itself as an
uncontrollable danger to society.124 This assertion, and the social media paradox, can be
illustrated by the 2011 riots that began in London as a result of the shooting, by police,
of Mark Duggan. In R v Blackshaw125 evidence suggested that social media was used to
coordinate riots and public disorder across the UK. According to Lord Judge CJ:
But modern technology has done away with the need for such direct personal communication.
It can all be done through Facebook or other social media. In other words, the abuse of modern
technology for criminal purposes extends to and includes incitement of very many people by a
121CIPD, Recruiting and pre-employment vetting in the social media era – CIPD publishes new gui-
dance for employers, 9 December 2013 available via <http://www.cipd.co.uk/pressofﬁce/press-
releases/recruiting-pre-employment-vetting-social-media-era-cipd-publishes-new-guidance-employers-
91213.aspx>.
122Google: Who would want the right to be forgotten? 14 May 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
magazine-27396981> accessed 21 May 2014. See also V. Dodd, Youth crime commissioner Paris
Brown stands down over Twitter row, The Guardian, 9 April 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/
uk/2013/apr/09/paris-brown-stands-down-twitter> accessed 1 May 2014.
123A. Edwards, Teenage youth crime commissioner who quit over offensive tweets is questioned by
Special Branch, Mail Online, 20 April 2013 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2312044/
Paris-Brown-Foul-mouthed-youth-commissioner-quit-offensive-tweets-questioned-police-caution.
html> accessed 21 May 2014.
124See generally: M. Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (MIT
Press, 2010); McGoldrick (n 41), 130.
125[2011] EWCA Crim 2312; McGoldrick (n 41), 130. As McGoldrick notes, there is also evidence
that social media was used in the Arab Spring to help facilitate democratic revolutions in the Arab
World; At the time of writing social media had been used to organise an illegal rave on National
Trust property in Surrey: See J. Loeb, Rave on: party at a beauty spot is too big for police to stop,
The Times (26 May 2014), 15.
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single step. Indeed it is a sinister feature of these cases that modern technology almost certainly
assisted rioters in other places to organise the rapid movement and congregation of disorderly
groups in new and unpoliced areas.126
To the contrary, in the aftermath of the riots, representations were made by Blackberry,
Facebook and Twitter to the UK Home Affairs Select Committee that, during the disturb-
ances, social media was also used for good purposes, for example, by innocent people to
ensure that their friends were safe, and by the police to organise their response. In the
Select Committee’s opinion it would be ‘actively unhelpful to switch off social media
during times of widespread and serious disorder’.127
5. Domestic regulation of social expression: criminal law
Clearly, the paradoxical nature of social media has an ability to enable the best and worst
expression. As a consequence, it has become a new breeding ground for legal action.128
However, as discussed above, unlike the transitory nature of things said in passing, or in
elation, anger or frustration, a 140-character Tweet, or a Facebook post, or a picture on
Snapchat or Instagram are, predominantly, permanent. In a legal terrain, which remains
largely uncharted, and is constantly shifting, the exponential growth of social media plat-
forms demonstrates our obsession with them, and the increasing power they wield. Conse-
quently, the permanency of this intersection between communication and technology
creates complex challenges for the law, and the multitude of stakeholders engaged with
social media. The HRC Rapporteur recognised the unique nature of the internet, and that
regulations or restrictions which may be legitimate and proportionate for traditional
media are not when it comes to new forms of media.129 Thus, applying laws designed
for an era that did not have access to social media, let alone envisage it, have been inap-
propriate130 and potentially incompatible with the right to freedom of expression.
However, the exponential growth of social media, and the pace of change it has brought,
has made it difﬁcult, if not impossible for the law to adjust adequately, as illustrated by
the criminal law.
5.1. Communications Act 2003
The provision most commonly engaged in relation to social media is section 127(1)(a) of
the Communications Act 2003,131 which makes it an offence to send:
… by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is
grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character.
126Ibid. at [73].
127Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the Disturbances of August 2011, Sixteenth Report of
Session 2010-2012, HC 1456-I, 27–30, 30.
128JJ. Henderson, The Boundaries of Free Speech in SocialMedia, in DR. Stewart (ed), Social Media
and the Law, (Routledge, 2013), 1.
129La Rue (n 10), [27].
130McGoldrick (n 41), 129; L. Scaife, The Regulation of Social Media, (2012) 14 E-Commerce Law&
Policy, 6.
131Cheshire (n 81); see also McGoldrick (n 41), 132 citing D. Ormerod, Telecommunications: Sending
Grossly Offensive Message By Means of a Public Electronic Communications Network (2007) Crim-
inal Law Review, Jan, 98–100.
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The offence is committed as soon as the message is sent. It does not matter whether it is
received by the intended recipient or anybody else.132 According to the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) the provision can be used as an alternative offence to such crimes as hate
crime (including race, religion, disability, homophobic, sexual orientation and transphobic
crime), hacking offences, cyber-bullying and cyber-stalking.133
5.1.1. The meaning of ‘grossly offensive’
5.1.1.1. DPP v Collins The leading judgment on what is meant by ‘grossly offensive’ was
handed down by the House of Lords inDPP v Collins,134 in which the respondent had made
a series of racist telephone calls, and left similar answerphone messages, to the ofﬁce of his
MP. In considering whether an offence had been committed pursuant to section 127(1)(a),
Lord Bingham stated that the standards of an open and just multi-racial society had to be
taken into account, as well as the context within which the words were said, along with
all the relevant circumstances. Thus, according to his Lordship:
There can be no yardstick of gross offensiveness otherwise than by the application of reason-
ably enlightened, but not perfectionist, contemporary standards to the particular message sent
in its particular context. The test is whether a message is couched in terms liable to cause gross
offence to those to whom it relates.135
Lord Bingham stressed that individuals are entitled to make their views known and to
express them strongly. Thus, the appropriate question to be considered by judges in deter-
mining whether expression is grossly offensive is whether the language used is beyond the
pale of what is tolerable in our society.136 His Lordship recognised that, prima facie, section
127(1)(a) does interfere with the right to freedom of expression, pursuant to Article 10(1)
ECHR. However, its restriction is prescribed by Article 10(2) which is directed to a legit-
imate objective: preventing the use of a public electronic communications network for
attacking the reputations and rights of others and, therefore, goes no further than is necess-
ary in a democratic society to achieve that end.137
At this point it is worth revisiting the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (and the HRC).
Article 10(1) has been interpreted to recognise a right for individuals to express themselves
in way that is offensive, shocking or disturbing. No mention of this was made in Collins.
There is a clear disconnect between the Collins’ test of whether the message will cause
gross offence to whom it relates/whether the language used is beyond the pale of what is
tolerable in our society and the right to offend, shock or disturb. It is submitted that in exer-
cising this right it is likely that the individual may ‘go beyond the pale’ of what is tolerable
within society at that given time.
Social media exacerbates the apparent tension between freedom of expression and this
test. As discussed above, individuals express themselves instantaneously, often without
132DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 per Lord Bingham, [8].
133Crown Prosecution Service, Improper use of public electronic communications network – Com-
munications Act 2003, section 127, available via <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/
communications_offences/> accessed 21 May 2014.
134[2006] UKHL 40.
135Ibid. [9].
136Crown Prosecution Service (n 133), [12].
137Ibid. [14].
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ﬁlter. Very often this may be communicated to their ‘society’ or ‘community’, who they
know will not take offence. However, as an ‘extension of man’, little thought is given to
the fact that a ‘wider society’ may see it, or to its potential permanency. The following
cases illustrate this point, and the difﬁculty in applying the test consistently in these
circumstances.
5.1.1.2. Daniel Thomas, Tom Daley and Twitter
In July 2012 Daniel Thomas, a Welsh Premier League footballer, posted the following
homophobic tweet on Twitter relating to Olympic divers Tom Daley and Peter Waterﬁeld:
‘If there is any consolation for ﬁnishing fourth at least Daley andWaterﬁeld can go and bum
each other #teamHIV.’ Although, initially, this was only tweeted to Thomas’ followers, it
was re-tweeted more widely. Thomas was arrested and the matter referred to the CPS to
consider whether he should be charged with a criminal offence. Due to the publicity the
case courted, the then DPP, Kier Starmer QC, issued a statement on social media communi-
cations.138 The DPP did not doubt that Thomas’ message was offensive, and would be
regarded as such by reasonable members of society. However, the question was whether
the message was so ‘grossly offensive’ as to be criminal and, if so, whether a prosecution
was required in the public interest.139 The DPP recognised that the distinction between
offensive and grossly offensive is critical, but is not easy to make. Accordingly, the
context and circumstances of the communication are relevant as is ECtHR’s statement in
Handyside.140
In relation to Thomas’ case, in the DPP’s opinion, the context and circumstances were
particularly pertinent, for the following reasons: (a) However misguided, the message was
intended to be humorous; (b) Although naive, there was no intention for the message to go
beyond Thomas’ followers, who were mainly friends and family; (c) Thomas took reason-
ably swift action to remove the message; (d) Thomas expressed remorse and was, for a
period, suspended by his football club;141 (e) Neither Daley or Waterﬁeld was the intended
recipient of the message and neither knew of its existence until it was brought to their atten-
tion following reports in the media; (f) In essence, this was a one-off offensive Twitter
message, intended for family and friends, which made its way into the public domain. It
was not intended to reach Daley and Waterﬁeld, it was not part of a campaign, it was
not intended to incite others and Thomas removed it reasonably swiftly and has expressed
remorse.142 Consequently, the prosecutor decided that it was not so grossly offensive that
criminal charges needed to be brought.
138DPP statement on Tom Daley case and social media prosecutions, 20 September 2012, available
via <http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-tom-daley-case-and-social-media-prosecutio
ns.html> accessed 22 May 2014.
139Ibid.
140DPP statement (n 138).
141Thomas was suspended for one match and ordered to pay a £500 ﬁne: TomDaley tweet: Port Talbot
footballer Daniel Thomas ﬁned <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-west-wales-20512439>
accessed 22 May 2014. A number of footballers have been suspended or ﬁned by their clubs and/or
the Football Association in relation to their use of social media. See generally: T. Lowles, Professional
Footballers and Twitter: A match made in (tabloid) heaven <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/
16/professional-footballers-and-twitter-a-match-made-in-tabloid-heaven-tim-lowles/#more-24668>
accessed 30 April 2014.
142DPP statement (n 138).
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5.1.1.3. DPP v Woods143 and other cases
Nineteen-year-old Matthew Woods was sentenced to 12 weeks imprisonment for Facebook
‘jokes’, relating to April Jones and Madeleine McCann, he made while drinking alcohol
with friends. Public reaction led to him being arrested for his own safety and he sub-
sequently pleaded guilty to the section 127(1)(a) offence. According to the prosecutor:
‘He started this idea when he was at a friend’s house, saw a joke on Sickipedia and
changed it slightly’.144 By virtue of being posted on his Facebook page, the joke became
available to a large number of people.
Woods’ case was heard in the context of a number of other incidents involving offensive
posts made on social media. For instance, Liam Stacey was jailed for 56 days after he
tweeted ‘LOL’ (laugh out loud) in response to the footballer Fabrice Muamba’s on-pitch
collapse, and subsequent racist and offensive comments he made after other people who
criticised him.145 In September 2012, Neil Swinburne was arrested over an offensive Face-
book tribute page set-up following the fatal shootings of two female police ofﬁcers in
Manchester.146
The decision to prosecute Woods seems to conﬂict with the DPP’s statement relating to
the treatment of Thomas, in particular the necessity to take into account the context and cir-
cumstances within which the communication was made (he was 19 years old at the time, he
was with friends, he had consumed alcohol, a variation of the joke was already in the public
domain on a well-known website) and the ECtHR’s statement in Handyside. It is submitted
that there is a clear difference between, on the one hand, Thomas and Woods-‘type’ com-
munications that are offensive, immature and thoughtless but were one off, unﬁltered and
instantaneous manifestations of a thought, compared with, on the other hand, the Stacey and
Swinburne-‘type’ communications, that were either sustained or, in the case of setting up a
Facebook page, pre-meditated and thought-out.
5.1.2. Of an indecent, obscene or menacing character
The section 127(1)(a) offence can also be committed when the communication is of an inde-
cent, obscene or menacing character. Chambers v DPP147 concerned a tweet alleged to be
of ‘menacing character’.
5.1.2.1. The ‘Twitter joke trial’
Paul Chambers was prosecuted and convicted for sending the following tweet, which, at
ﬁrst instance, was held to be of a ‘menacing character’: ‘Crap! Robin Hood airport is
closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your s**t together otherwise I’m blowing the
airport sky high!!’
Chambers’ appeal to the Crown Court was dismissed on the basis that the tweet’s
content was menacing per se, and that an ordinary person seeing the tweet would see it
in that way and be alarmed.148 This is despite Robin Hood Airport classifying Chambers’
143Unrep. October 2012 (MC).
144Scaife (n 25), 5.
145Ibid.
146McGoldrick (n 41), 133.
147[2012] EWHC 2157.
148Ibid. [17] citing Her Honour Judge Davies.
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‘threat’ as ‘non-credible’,149 and that it was ‘nothing other than a foolish comment posted as
a joke for only his close friends to see’.150 Chambers subsequently appealed to the Div-
isional Court of the High Court, which took an entirely contrary view to the Crown
Court, and allowed the appeal on the basis that the tweet did not constitute, or include, a
message of a menacing character.151 According to Lord Judge CJ:
… if the person or persons who receive or read it, or may reasonably be expected to receive, or
read it, would brush it aside as a silly joke, or a joke in bad taste, or empty bombastic or ridi-
culous banter, then it would be a contradiction in terms to describe it as a message of a mena-
cing character. In short, a message which does not create fear or apprehension in those to whom
it is communicated, or who may reasonably be expected to see it, falls outside this provision,
for the very simple reason that the message lacks menace.152
Although his Lordship was clear that the 2003 Act was not drafted to interfere with
freedom of expression, pursuant to Article 10(1)153 it is submitted that there is potential
for prosecutions brought under section 127(1)(a) to face resistance from Article 10(1)
ECHR, on the basis that the right to freedom of expression incorporates the right to
offend, shock or disturb. Lord Judge CJ’s judgment does not assimilate easily with the
world of social media where, as can be seen above with regard to, for instance, ‘speaker
control’ issues, there is no such thing as an audience who may be reasonably expected to
receive or read a post, picture or tweet that is sent spontaneously, without ﬁlter. Thoughts,
feelings and frustrated rants or inappropriate jokes can be sent, initially, to a very small
group and then re-disseminated to a potentially unlimited audience. Although the initial
‘group’ may not see the message as being indecent, or obscene or menacing, members
of a wider audience may do. In the context of ‘grossly offensive’ communications, the
inability for his Lordship’s test to work effectively in the context of social media communi-
cations is clearly apparent in the inconsistent decisions relating to Matthew Woods and
Daniel Thomas.
5.2. Other provisions applied to social media expression
Other criminal law provisions that have been applied to social media expression include the
Malicious Communications Act 1988, a piece of legislation drafted to deal with poison pen
letters.154 Section 1(1) provides that it is an offence to send to another person, inter alia, an
electronic communication which conveys (a) (i) a message which is indecent or grossly
offensive; (ii) a threat; (iii) information which is false and known or believed to be false
by the sender; or (b) which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive
nature, if one of the sender’s purposes is to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient or
any other person the sender intends the contents of the message to be communicated
to. According to Haralambous and Johnson, the Act is unclear as to whether, for
example, posts on Facebook constitute sending a message to another person.155
However, the Act has been applied to some digital communications, including social
149Chambers (n 147), [13].
150Ibid. [15].
151Chambers (n 147), [38] per Lord Judge CJ.
152Ibid. [30].
153Chambers (n 147), [28].
154Law Commission Report on Poison Pen Letters (1985) Law Com. No. 147.
155N. Haralambous and M. Johnson, Facebook – Friend or Foe? (2010) 174 JPN 469, 470.
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media expression.156 Provisions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may also
give rise to criminal liability for social media expression amounting to cyber-bullying (trol-
ling) or online harassment. For instance, section 1 provides that a person must not pursue a
course of conduct157 that amounts to harassment (alarming or causing the victim distress158)
of another. Section 4 provides for the aggravated offence of putting the victim in fear of
violence on at least two occasions. Section 2A159 relates speciﬁcally to stalking160 and,
by virtue of s2A(3), cyber-stalking.161
Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 provides that it is an offence for a person to use
‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour’162 or display
‘any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting’
which causes ‘that or another person harassment, alarm or distress’.163 Section 4A(3)
excludes from the ambit of the offence situations where the defendant and the recipient
of the communication were inside a dwelling, thus offering some protection for private
speech.164 However, according to the District Judge in S v Director of Public Prosecu-
tions165 ‘any person who posts material on the Internet puts that material within the
public ambit’.166 As social media embodies the ‘extension of man’ theory, individuals
can forget that what they are expressing is not communicated within a private arena,
such as a dwelling. It is submitted that, to them, they are still ‘in private’, even though
their thoughts and feelings can, potentially, be communicated to a very wide audience.
Therefore, such communications, unless falling precisely within section 4A(3), are
within the ‘public ambit’, and are captured by the offence.
The mens rea of the offence provides some protection for social media expression, as it
requires an intention to cause harassment, alarm or distress. However, the requirement that
the speech is insulting, and causes distress, is a low threshold167 that clearly does not accord
with the right to offend, shock or disturb. For instance, ‘insulting banter’ between individ-
uals, that may have once remained within private arenas, such as a house or a pub, can now
play out over social media, exposing individuals to potential prosecution. This concern is
reﬂected by the judgment in Ajit Singh Dehal v Crown Prosecution Service168 where it
was held that a prosecution under section 4A would not comply with Article 10 unless it
was brought to maintain public order.169
156For example, in 2012 a man received a four month suspended sentence after an online discussion
about football resulted in him posting a tweet referring to Newcastle United as ‘Coon Army’: The
Northern Echo, 28 February 2012.
157Section 7(3) provides that, in relation to a single person, a course of conduct must involve conduct
on at least 2 occasions.
158Section 7(2); DPP v Ramsdale [2001] EWHC Admin 106.
159Inserted by section 111 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
160Section 4A provides for the aggravated offence of stalking involving fear of violence or serious
alarm or distress.
161See generally: J. Agate and J. Ledward, Social media: how the net is closing in on cyber bullies,
Ent. L.R. 2013, 24(8), 263–68; N. MacEwan, The new stalking offences in English law: will they
provide effective protection from cyberstalking? Crim. L.R. 2012, 10, 767–81.
162Section 4A(1)(a).
163Section 4A(1)(b).
164Rowbottom (n 25), 360.
165[2008] EWHC 438 (Admin).
166Ibid. [4] per Lord Justice Maurice Kay citing the District Judge.
167Rowbottom (n 25), 360.
168[2005] EWHC 2154 (Admin).
169Ibid. [12].
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Section 5 of the Act is broader in application as it does not require the communication to
actually cause harassment, alarm or distress,170 or that the communicator intends this.
However, section 5(1)(b) requires that the words or behaviour ‘be within the hearing or
sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’. It remains
unclear whether social media communications are within the ambit of section 5(1)(b), or
if it applies exclusively to physical proximity. For example, Maurice Kay LJ’s judgment
in S v DPP implies that the provision does not apply to websites as, according to his Lord-
ship, the omission in section 4A of the ‘within sight or hearing’ requirement ‘was con-
ditioned by an appreciation of the problems created by the posting of offensive material
on websites’.171 However, as Rowbottom suggests, this case does not provide a deﬁnitive
statement of the law, as it relates to whether, for the purposes of section 4A, the victim must
actually see the material on the internet, or if it is sufﬁcient to be made aware of its existence
or shown a copy by a third party at a later date.172 Other commentators are of the opinion
that the section does apply to expression on the internet.173
If social media expression does come within the province of the provision, it creates
clear tension with the right to freedom of expression. For example, a person may post an
abusive or insulting message on Facebook or a tweet to their followers knowing that this
‘community’ would not be caused harassment, alarm or distress. However, as this is a
‘conduct crime’, meaning that there is no requirement that harm is actually caused to an
individual for a successful prosecution to ensue, if that message or tweet is disseminated,
beyond their control, to a wider audience, an offence could be committed so long as it is
seen by somebody likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.
5.2.1. Freedom of expression and the DPP’s interim guidelines
The apparent ‘tension’ between the array of criminal law provisions that could be engaged
in relation to social media communications and freedom of expression, and the jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR and HRC, did not go unnoticed by the previous DPP, when he
made his statement on social media prosecutions. The statement recognised that the
context within which real-time social media expression and interaction occurs is different
from that within which other communication and expression takes place. Consequently,
in cases involving social media, the CPS has to balance ‘the fundamental right of free
speech and the need to prosecute serious wrongdoing on a case by case basis’.174 The
DPP recognised that the CPS was making very difﬁcult judgment calls on whether or
not to prosecute, as social media expression was (and still is) largely uncharted terrain:
In some cases it is clear that a criminal prosecution is the appropriate response to conductwhich is
complained about, for example where there is a sustained campaign of harassment of an individ-
ual, where court orders are ﬂouted or where grossly offensive or threatening remarks are made
and maintained. But in many other cases a criminal prosecution will not be the appropriate
response. If the fundamental right to free speech is to be respected, the threshold for criminal pro-
secution has to be a high one and a prosecution has to be required in the public interest.175
170Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564.
171S v DPP, [12] and [15] per Maurice Kay LJ.
172Rowbottom (n 25), 361.
173N. Haralambous and N. Geach, Regulating Harassment: Is the Law Fit for the Social Networking
Age? (2009) 73(3) Journal of Criminal Law 241, 256–56.
174DPP statement (n 138).
175Ibid.
Information & Communications Technology Law 37
The DPP announced in the statement that he intended to issue Interim Guidelines for
prosecutors dealing social media cases. He also stated that ‘[s]ocial media is a new and
emerging phenomenon raising difﬁcult issues of principle… the time has come for an
informed debate about the boundaries of free speech in an age of social media’.176
The Interim Guidelines177 distinguish between two categories of cases. Category one
includes communications: which may constitute credible threats of violence to persons
or damage to property; which speciﬁcally target one or more individuals; which may
amount to a breach of a court order.178 This category of communications must be prose-
cuted robustly.179 Category two incorporates communications that may be considered
grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false.180 Such communications will be subject to
a high threshold, and in many cases a prosecution is unlikely to be in the public interest,181
although they are not precluded from prosecution.
According to the Guidelines the rationale behind categorising communications in this
way is due to the potential ‘chilling effect’ prosecutions relating to social media expression
may have on freedom of expression.182 Thus, the Guidelines were drafted with the intention
of ensuring compliance with Article 10.183 This is clearly evidenced with respect to the high
threshold, as the Guidelines state that the common law and applicable legislation must be
interpreted consistently with Article 10 as interpreted by ECtHR jurisprudence,184 includ-
ing Handyside.
The Guidelines’ common sense approach to social media expression is illustrated
further in the context of sections 1 and 127(1)(a) of the Malicious Communications Act
1988 and Communications Act 2003 respectively, in that it reminds prosecutors that
what is prohibited under these provisions is the sending of a communication that is
grossly offensive. Accordingly, a communication has to be more than simply offensive to
be contrary to the criminal law. Therefore, just because the content expressed in the com-
munication is in bad taste, controversial or unpopular, and may cause offence to individuals
or a speciﬁc community, does not, in itself, require the engagement of the criminal law.185
Furthermore, prosecutors are required to consider the context in which real-time social
media communications operate and to have regard to the fact that ‘[a]ccess is ubiquitous
and instantaneous. Banter, jokes and offensive comments are commonplace and often spon-
taneous. Communications intended for a few may reach millions’.186 Consequently, prose-
cutors should only proceed with prosecutions pursuant to these provisions where, on the
facts and merits of the individual case a prosecution is both necessary and proportionate
in accordance with Article 10,187 and they are satisﬁed that the communication in question
176DPP statement (n 138).
177CPS Guidelines (n 102).
178Ibid. [12].
179CPS Guidelines (n 102), [13].
180Ibid. [12].
181CPS Guidelines (n 102), [13].
182Ibid. [29].
183CPS Guidelines (n 102), [30]–[36]; see also McGoldrick (n 41), 136.
184Ibid. [30]–[33].
185CPS Guidelines (n 102), [34].
186Ibid. [35].
187CPS Guidelines (n 102), [38]–[39]; A prosecution is unlikely to be both necessary and proportion-
ate where: (a) The suspect has swiftly taken action to remove the communication or expressed genuine
remorse; (b) Swift and effective action has been taken by others for example, service providers, to
remove the communication in question or otherwise block access to it; (c) The communication was
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is more than: offensive, shocking or disturbing; or satirical, iconoclastic or rude comment;
or the expression of unpopular or unfashionable opinion about serious or trivial matters, or
banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or painful to those subjected to it. If satisﬁed,
prosecutors should go on to consider whether a prosecution is required in the public inter-
est.188 Finally, the age and maturity of suspects should be given signiﬁcant weight, as chil-
dren may not appreciate the potential harm and seriousness of their communications. In
these instances, a prosecution will rarely be in the public interest.189
6. Conclusion
The use of different criminal law legislation, designed and drafted for a time before the
advent of social media, effectively re-contextualises the application of these provisions.
Instead of applying to an environment where a parent, teacher or police ofﬁcer could
provide a warning to an individual using, for instance, threatening or abusive language,
they now operate in a world where the individual who posts a tweet, or shares a Snapchat
or Instagram image, will have a very different idea as to their responsibilities and, by virtue
of the remoteness of the online world, the consequences that may ensue from their actions.
As an extension of man, the use of social media erodes individuals’ perceptions of private
and public boundaries, meaning the public arena is effectively blurred with their ‘private
community’. Clearly, had the Guidelines been in place at the time the prosecutions dealt
with above were initiated, a more contextualised and consistent approach, in line with
Article 10 and its jurisprudence, may have been applied. It is submitted that the Guidelines
can bring a semblance of order to the multitude of legislation and common law jurispru-
dence that can be applied to social media communications. They effectively mitigate,
what was (and, to an extent, still is), a ‘square peg round hole’ regime. Thus, prima
facie the Guidelines, and the common sense and contextualised approach they advocate,
accord with ECHR, ECtHR, ICCPR and HRC principles of freedom of expression. Further-
more, it is submitted that these Guidelines, in theory, have the potential to provide the equi-
librium that is needed to both protect individuals and facilitate the notion of a purer form of
expression, exercised through the use of social media.
However, the overall impact of the criminalisation of expression remains to be seen. A
recent Sky News investigation provides some insight into the Guidelines potential long-
term effect. According to the report, almost 23,000 people have been investigated by
police in the last three years relating to social media abuse, offensive Twitter messages
and online bullying, equating to 20 cases per day; a 5% increase on 2011. Despite the
higher threshold set by the Guidelines, and the requirement for prosecutors to consider
the context in which the communication was made, including giving weight to the age
of the communicator,190 these ﬁgures look as though they will continue to rise. Prosecutions
pursuant to section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003 continue to be the preferred
not intended for a wide audience, nor was that the obvious consequence of sending the communi-
cation; particularly where the intended audience did not include the victim or target of the communi-
cation in question; or (d) The content of the communication did not obviously go beyond what could
conceivably be tolerable or acceptable in an open and diverse society which upholds and respects
freedom of expression.
188Ibid. [36].
189CPS Guidelines (n 102), [41].
190Cheshire (n 81): It is clear from the report that children are increasingly been prosecuted for
offences stemming from the use of social media.
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option for the CPS, as evidenced by the following statistics, provided by 34 of the UK’s 51
police forces: In 2011/12, 919 people were investigated. This rose to 6974 in 2012/13 and,
in the ﬁrst nine months of 2013/14, 7318 people had already been subjected to
investigation.191
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